Predicting how cooperative behavior arises in the thermodynamic limit is one of the outstanding problems in evolutionary game theory. For two player games, cooperation is seldom the Nash equilibrium. However, in the thermodynamic limit cooperation is the natural recourse regardless of whether we are dealing with humans or animals. In this work we use the analogy with the Ising model to predict how cooperation arises in the thermodynamic limit.
I. INTRODUCTION
The solution to any game theoretic problem involves finding an equilibrium strategy known as the Nash equilibrium, whence deviating from this strategy brings in more loss to the player. However, many times the Nash equilibrium is not the best possible outcome. The best outcome in a game is known as Pareto optimal which is the maximum benefit that both players can simultaneously have in that game. For example, in Prisoners dilemma the Nash equilibrium is both players choose to defect, however the Pareto optimal strategy would be both players choosing to cooperate. An introduction to Nash equilibrium for two player two strategy games can be found in [1] .
Game theory is not just about two players, many situations arise wherein one needs to go beyond two players. To analyze conflicts between countries, which is seldom between just two countries many other countries are involved too. For example, price fixing by the oil cartel OPEC, which is a fourteen country club. Further, the United Nations is a 190 country institution. However, for human beings, one has to go to millions to see how humans organize and form collectives like state, religion and country. To analyze such a situation in a game theoretic setting one needs to go beyond two players to a game with infinite number of players, i.e., the thermodynamic limit.
A particularly interesting problem arises in the context of evolution, where we see that cooperation arises even when defection is the preferred choice of individuals [2] . Cooperation in short term might not seem beneficial however, in the long run the population which cooperates survives. It has been shown in Ref. [3] that in iterative Prisoner's dilemma, cooperation can become the Nash equilibrium given the number of players are finite and some players can opt for tit-for-tat scheme, i.e., if the opponent defects in one turn then in the next turn, player himself defects. In this paper, we use statistical mechan- * subhayan.s@niser.ac.in † colin.nano@gmail.com ics tools to see whether and how cooperation emerges in the thermodynamic limit. Using the analogy with the 1D Ising model, we try to understand the equilibrium strategy in a population and predict how cooperative behavior emerges in the thermodynamic limit. We model a situation similar to 1D Ising model, where the sites are replaced by players and spin up or spin down correspond to the strategies s 1 or s 2 adopted by the players. Magnetization in Ising model is defined as the difference in the number of spin up and spin down particles. Similarly, Magnetization in game theory can be defined as the difference in the number of players choosing strategy s 1 or s 2 . We first relate the Ising model to the payoff's in game theory and then apply this method first to Prisoner's dilemma and then to game of Chicken (variant of Hawk-Dove game). There have been earlier attempts to use the 1D Ising model to find the equilibrium strategy in the thermodynamic limit [2] . We find that there are some unphysical implications of the results of Ref. [2] . This paper is organized as follows-section II connects the 1D Ising model to the payoffs of game theory by extending the analogy of Ref.
[4] to the thermodynamic limit, then in section III we calculate the Magnetization which gives the Nash equilibrium strategy for Prisoner's dilemma in the thermodynamic limit. We observe how cooperators arise in Prisoner's dilemma in the thermodynamic limit even when defection is the Nash equilibrium. Further, we deal with the problems associated with the model of Ref.
[2] in brief. In section IV we do a similar analysis for the game of Chicken which has no unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the two player case. We find how in the thermodynamic limit majority of cooperators can emerge. We end with the conclusions.
II. 1D ISING MODEL AND GAME THEORY
The 1D Ising model [5] consists of spins that can be in either of the two states +1 (↑) or −1 (↓). The spins are arranged in a line, and can only interact with their nearest neighbors. The Hamiltonian of such a system can be written as
where J is the coupling between the spins, h is the external magnetic field and σ's denote the spin. The partition function corresponding to the Hamiltonian (Eq. (1)) is
β denotes the inverse temperature 1/K B T . σ i denotes either the spin up (+1) or spin down (-1). In order to carry out the spin sum, we define a matrix T with elements as follows,
Using the transfer matrix and carrying out the spin sum via the completeness relation, the partition function from Eq. (2) in the large N limit can be written as
Since the Free energy F = −KT lnZ, the Magnetization is
In Fig. 1 In Ref.
[4], it has been shown that a one-to-one correspondence can be made between 1D Ising model Hamiltonian and the payoff matrix for a particular game. We first look at a general payoff matrix for two player game and understand the method of Ref. [4] ,
where U (s i , s j ) is the payoff function with a, b, c, d as the payoffs for row player and a , b , c , d are the payoffs for column player, s 1 and s 2 denote the strategies adopted by the two players. For symmetric games, generally the payoff is written for only the row player and the payoffs for column player can be inferred from them. Thus,
Making a transformation, by adding of a factor λ to the s 1 column and µ to the s 2 column, we have-
As shown in Ref.
[4], under such a transformation the Nash equilibrium doesn't change (see appendix for more details). Following Ref.
[4] and choosing the transformations as λ = − a+c 2 and µ = − b+d 2 . The transformed matrix becomes-
To calculate the Nash equilibrium of a generalized two player game in the thermodynamic limit, we have to relate the transformed payoff matrix of the classical game as in Eq. (8) to the Ising model Hamiltonian with two spins. When N = 2, the Hamiltonian (Eq. (1)) can be written as-
So the individual energies of the spins 1 and 2 can be written as:
It is to be noted that equilibrium in Ising model corresponds to minimizing the energies of spins. Now for symmetric coupling as in Eq.'s (2,9) minimizing Hamiltonian H with respect to spins σ 1 , σ 2 is same as maximizing −H with respect to σ 1 , σ 2 . In game theory, players search for the Nash equilibrium. This implies maximizing the payoff function U (s i , s j ) Eq.'s (5-8) with respect to strategies s i , s j which for the two player Ising model is equivalent to maximizing −E i Eq. (10) with respect to spins σ i , σ j . Thus, the Ising game matrix can be written (see Ref.
[4] for derivation of Eq. (11)) for the row player as-
Comparing the matrix elements of the transformed payoff matrix-Eq. (8) to the Ising game matrix Eq. (11), we get the relation between parameters of Ising model (J and h) and the payoffs of two player game as-
This completes the connection of the payoffs from a two player game to Ising model relating spins in the thermodynamic limit. β in Ising model is the inverse temperature. Decreasing β or increasing the temperature increases the randomness of the spin orientation. Thus, decreasing β in Magnetization for game matrix Eq.'s (4,11) increases randomness in the strategic choices of the players. In the following sections we will apply this to some famous two player games so as to analyze them in the thermodynamic limit.
III. PRISONER'S DILEMMA
In this game, the police are questioning two suspects in separate cells. Each has two choices: to cooperate with each other and not confess the crime (C), or defect to the police and confess the crime (D). We construct the Prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix by taking the matrix elements from Eq.'s (5,6) as a = r, d = p, b = s and c = t, with t > r > p > s where r is the reward, t is the temptation, s is the sucker's payoff and p is the punishment. Thus, the payoff matrix is-
The values in the payoff matrix can be explained as follows-reward r means 1 year in jail while punishment p means 10 years in jail, sucker's payoff s represents a life sentence while temptation t implies no jail time. Independent of the other suspects choice, one can improve his own position by defecting. Therefore the Nash equilibrium in this case is to defect. However if both players trusted each other and chose to cooperate, then both have to spend less time in jail, so the Pareto optimal strategy is to cooperate. This is the dilemma [1] . Following the calculations in section II to make the connection with the Ising Hamiltonian, we add λ = − s < p < r, in the thermodynamic limit Nash equilibrium is always the defect strategy. A phase transition would occur only if p < t − r − s which is not possible as the punishment p > s. When β decreases, Magnetization decreases, which implies that number of cooperators increases. As β → 0, m → 0, implying equal number of cooperators and defectors. At finite and large β as seen from Fig. 2 , in the thermodynamic limit for p > 1.5 almost all are defectors. However, in the range 0 < p < 1.5 there is a drastic decrease in the number of defectors so much so that around p = .5 regardless of β in the thermodynamic limit 35 % of the population tend to cooperate. In the next section we approach this problem via the method proposed in Ref.
[2] and unravel some deficiencies in the method of Ref.
[2].
A. Problems with the approach of Ref.
[2]
The connection between Ising model and game theory as shown in section II is not the only approach available. In Ref.
[2] too, it has been shown that in the thermodynamic limit games can be modeled using 1D Ising model. However, when one analyses the Prisoner's dilemma game using the approach of Ref.
[2], the results are not compatible with the basic tenets of the game for some cases, as shown below.
When reward r approaches temptation b
Considering the Prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix as in Eq. (14) below
where r = b − c, b > r > 0 and b > c > 0. The Eq. (14) is the payoff matrix used in Ref.
[2]. This is similar to Eq. (12) by taking reward as r, temptation as b, sucker's payoff as −c and punishment as 0 with the condition r = b − c. The Magnetization is found in Ref.
[2] using a different approach than section II to be-
This magnetization is independent of temptation b unlike that derived in Eq. (13). Although in Ref.
[2] it has been shown that for all values of reward r, the dominant choice is to defect but this is not true in the limiting case when r approaches b. We analyze the same situation using the payoff matrix of the Prisoner's dilemma and we see an inconsistency-
When reward r equals the temptation b, there is no unique Nash equilibrium, i.e., both strategies cooperation and defection are equiprobable. The players can equally choose between cooperation and defection and hence Magnetization (m) should be 0. However, from Ref.
[2] the Magnetization is negative (see Fig. 3 inset) which means that defect is the Nash equilibrium which is not correct.
The reward r approaches 0
Another situation where Ref.
[2]'s results are negated is when r = 0, m tends to 0 as in Eq. (14) implying equal number of cooperators and defectors. However, when we look at the payoff matrix (Eq. (14)) for r = 0:
As can be clearly seen in Fig. 3 inset, defection is still the Nash equilibrium which is not correct. From our calculations as done in section II, III and using payoff matrix Eq. (14) Further, when reward r approaches 0, the m → -1. Our approach corrects the problems in Ref. [2] in the limiting cases when r → 0 and r → b. This will be elaborately dealt with in Ref.
[6] along with the case of Public goods game with and without punishment. In the next section we extend this approach to the game of Chicken.
IV. GAME OF CHICKEN
The name "Chicken" has its origins in a game in which two teenagers drive their vehicles towards each other at high speeds [1] . Each has two strategies: one is to swerve and the other is going straight. If one teenager swerves and the other drives straight, then the one who swerved will be called a "Chicken" or coward. "Hawk−Dove" game, on the other hand refers to a situation in which players compete for a shared resource and can choose either mediate (Dove strategy) or fight for the resource (Hawk strategy).
The parameterized payoff matrix from Eq. (5) 
where "r" denotes the reputation and "s" denotes the cost of injury and s > r > 0. If one teen swerves before the other, then the one who drives straight gains in reputation while the other loses reputation. However, if both drive straight, there is a crash, and both are injured. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibriums (straight, swerve) and (swerve, straight). Each gives a payoff of r to one player and -r to the other. There is another mixed strategy Nash equilibrium given by (σ, σ), where [σ = p.straight+(1 − p).swerve] where p = r s (p is the probability to choose straight). In "Hawk-dove" the reputation from game of "Chicken" is replaced by the value of resource and the cost of injury doesn't change. Similar to game of "Chicken", the Hawk-Dove game has two pure strategy Nash equilibrium: (Hawk, Dove) and (Dove, Hawk) and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (σ, σ): [σ = p.Hawk + (1 − p) .Dove]. Thus, from a gametheoretic point of view, "Chicken" and "Hawk−Dove" are identical. We analyze the game of Chicken in the thermodynamic limit. This is same as the Hawk−Dove game in the thermodynamic limit. Following the calculations in section II to make the correct connection with the Ising Hamiltonian, we add λ = − 
Plotting Magnetization (m) as in Eq. (19), we see from Fig. 4 that as the reputation r increases more than s/2, more players choose straight as choosing swerve would bring a higher loss in reputation. Similarly, when r < s/2 then players would rather choose to swerve and not get injured. Further, it should be noted from Eq. (19) that as the cost of injury increases (see Fig. 4 inset), the Magnetization becomes more positive implying that more players choose to swerve or cooperate.
Since game of Chicken and Hawk-Dove game are equivalent in game theory, it can be inferred from the above results that for Hawk-Dove game as the value of resource increases keeping the cost of injury constant, then more fraction of players choose the Hawk strategy (defect) or fight for the resource. Further, when the cost of injury increases then the players are reluctant to fight for the resource as getting injured is more expensive. Thus, larger fraction of players end up choosing Dove strategy(cooperate), i.e., sharing the resource when cost of injury is high.
It is worth noting that contrary to the notion as in two player games that the players would always opt for the Nash equilibrium strategy, in the thermodynamic limit this is not true. In the thermodynamic limit our results show that a larger fraction of the players would choose the Nash equilibrium strategy but not every player. For example, when the temptation decreases in Prisoner's dilemma the fraction of cooperators increases even when the Nash equilibrium is to defect. This is particularly intriguing as when the choice for every individual should be to defect as in the two player Prisoner's dilemma both players choosing defect, i.e., (D,D) is the Nash equilibrium. A natural extension in the thermodynamic limit would be that every player would choose to defect however, there is a finite fraction of players who choose cooperation which increases as the temptation (t) decreases. Further, we see in game of Chicken that even if the reputation becomes high still there is a small fraction of players who choose to swerve and lose. This shows that in the thermodynamic limit cooperation does emerge even when defection would be the preferred choice of the individual players.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our aim in this work was to understand how cooperative behavior emerges in the thermodynamic limit? We observe that in the thermodynamic limit, larger fraction of players choose the Nash equilibrium strategy of the two player game. However, there is a finite fraction of players who don't opt for the Nash equilibrium strategy. Further, we see in Prisoner's dilemma that in thermodynamic limit slightly reducing the punishment below r/3 where r is the reward increases the fraction of cooperators by a large amount even when the Nash equilibrium is to defect. Even in game of "Chicken", when cost of injury is low the best choice for the players is to choose straight or defect. However, we find that still there exist a large fraction of players who choose to swerve or cooperate. In future works [6] , we extend our model of predicting cooperative behavior in the thermodynamic limit to Public goods game with and without punishment.
[ Let's take the generalized game theory payoff matrix for two player games
Transforming the elements of the payoff matrix by adding a factor λ, λ to column 1 and µ, µ to column 2 we get:
In Ref.
[4], it has been shown that under the above transformations as in Eq. (22), the Nash equilibrium remains unchanged. Different possible combinations for the relations between a, b, c, and d are taken which give different outcomes for the Nash equilibrium. In Ref.
[4] each of those outcomes are considered and then shown to remain unchanged under the transformation as in Eq. (22). Herein, we give a simple proof of this above conclusion using fixed point analysis. A fixed point is a point on the coordinate space which maps a function to the coordinate. For a two dimensional coordinate space, a fixed point of a function f (x, y) is mathematically defined as (x, y) such that [7] f (x, y) = (x, y).
From Brouwer's fixed point theorem it is known that a 2D triangle ∆ 2 has a fixed point property. This implies that any function which defines all the points inside a 2D triangle has a fixed point (for a detailed proof of this theorem refer to [7] ). Also the probabilities for choosing a strategy, represents points inside a square of side length 1. Thus S 2,2 = (x, y) with 0 < x < 1 and 0 < y < 1, where x represents the probability of choosing a strategy by row player and y represents the probability of choosing a strategy by column player. It can shown that a triangle and a square are topologically equivalent [7] , and this implies that if a triangle has a fixed point property, so does a square. So a function is constructed such that it represents all the points inside the square. To construct the function [7] , a vector with coordinates (u 1 , u 2 ) and another vector with coordinate (v 1 , v 2 ) are defined as follows-
and
where x and y are the probabilities to choose a particular strategy. A and B denote the respective payoff matrix for row player and column player. Using this, the fixed point function from Eq. (23) is given by f (x, y) = x + (u 1 − u 2 )
where (u 1 − u 2 ) + = u1−u2+|u1−u2| 2 and (v 1 − v 2 ) + = v1−v2+|v1−v2| 2
. We determine u 1 , u 2 , v 1 and v 2 for the payoff matrix as in Eq. (21) and then the transformed one Eq. (22). For the payoff matrix Eq. (21) we get the
